241
20 Up to now we have been treating the matter from
a purely military point of view. We cannot, however,
inore some political considerations which weigh
heavily upon the military position. To judge
exactly what the re-action of the arrival of large
military forces at Shanghai will be upon the situation
in China, is beyond our province. We understand,
however, that up to now the advance of the Chinese
Nationalist forces has been accompanied by an accession to their strength
of large bodies of their antagonists,
and it appears not improbable that by the time they
reach Shanghai their forces may be largely swollen
in the same manier.
WO
Further/are not in a position
to judge whether or to rat extent the resistance
of Shanghai may be accompanied by a spontaneous outbreak
of anti-foreign moverents in other parts of hina and
by organised action for the recovery of the Concession
at Tientsin similar to that taken on the Yangtse.
We have no doubt that a purely British resistance
at Shanghai would produce the most serious consequences
to British interests in China,
Possibly, however,
the Nationalist Government may pause before taking such
a large part action as would unite
of the world against
them.
7
21, Another danger which, perhaps, cannot altogether
be excluded is that the Chinese Nationalists, on
approaching Shanghai, may follow the same course as
at Hankow and make the British Concession their sole
objective.
while
We are informed, however, that in
confined themselves tu
the past/the French have
Concession,
::/
their own
the Japanese and Americans have
at Shanghai
co-operated with us, A third risk is that in the
12.
Page 220Page 221
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.